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In the first part of this
delivery, a historic backgroung over 10 years - from early 1990s onwards,
had been exposed, to assist readers understand the political snafu, imbroglio
resulting from the presidential ballot held in Ivory Coast on November 28,
2010. To explain why, on the date of this writing on January 14, 2011, Ivory
Coast has two presidents and two appointed prime ministers.
Indeed
two different institutions, the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI)
and the Constitutional Court of Ivory Coast (CCIC), each declared winner
a different candidate, with different winning percentage. Please
consult the first delivery before reading this current
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The Constitutional Court or the Independent Electoral Commission: Which entity
has the preeminence?
Some observers of the Ivory Coast's
political stage - relying only on the Gbagbo's camp propaganda machine,
or being staunch supporters of Gbagbo "nationalistic" stances
against foreign interventions, believe that the CCIC is the final decision
making body in the electoral process outcome in Ivory Coast. They believe
that once CCIC proclaims the results - for presidential and
parliament elections, these are true, valid, and final.
In normal circumstances, when the country is not experiencing
political troubles that is correct. CCIC has the final say about electoral
results.
 Ivory
Coast, however, is engulfed into political troubles since September 2002, following
the attempted coup led by Northerners, to topple the Gbagbo's regime - in place
since 2000. The coup half-failed, but the Northerners seized half of the national
territory, setup a local administration and have a
standing army - in defiance of the one in the south "supporting" Gbagbo.
To put an end to the troubles, and stop political fighting and bickering,
and reunite the country, the antagonistic parties
signed a series of Agreements - some
listed here - sponsored by the International Community.
The one signed at Pretoria on April 7, 2005, called the Pretoria Agreement,
includes articles stating that the CEI will be in charge of
organizing and supervising the presidential ballot, validating and certifying the fairness
of the ballot, and proclaiming the results to be endorsed and accepted
by the CCIC.
These had been included in the Pretoria Agreement because, the antagonistic
parties - particularly the opposition in the South and the rebels from
the North, asked for it. They (the opposition and the rebels) do not trust
the CCIC, a State Legal Organization, under the supervision of Gbagbo's
camp, and wanted an additional protection for fair and transparent ballot.
Further, that prerogative given to the UN's special representative in Ivory Coast,
to certify and validate the results of the presidential ballot, had been, first,
included in UN Resolution 1764/2007, and second, made a national law by a presidential
decree, signed by Gbagbo, on April 2008.
So, based on above discussion, it is clear and undisputable that the CEI
has preeminence on the Constitutional Court to proclaiming the presidential
ballot results in Ivory Coast, in this particular case of the presidential
ballot held November 28, 2010.
Claiming the contrary as Gbagbo's camp
and followers are forcibly trying to do, reversing the results, and hijacking
the election, to deprive the true winner, Alassane Dramane Ouattara of
his victory, is a sheer and blatant show of political dishonesty.
- Dishonesty, jackal practice, and bullying
mentality
As reported in previous deliveries [1, 2, 3]
the main cause that triggered September 19, 2002 coup against Gbagbo's
regime, dated back to the Ivoirité
nationalistic concept, cooked by Bedie, in the early 1990s, to deny Ivory
Coast's citizenship to Ouattara, and stop him running for the presidency.
When Gbagbo comes to power in 2000, he did not clarified his position
about the divisive concept. In the contrary, he endeavored to put it stealthily
in practice, for instance excluding Army officers from the North
from promotion lists.
The problem was that Ouattara was not the only one affected by the Ivoirité
concept. Several millions Northerners suddenly become strangers in
their own country, having no identification card, and facing insuperable
obstacles, and permanent humiliation to have one issued to them.
To regain
their citizenship they have no choice but to fight for the state power.
That is the reason why they stage September 19, 2002 coup.
And now, what is Gbagbo is doing? He is simply putting in practice
the Ivoirité concept again, because, in order to reverse the results
proclaimed by the CEI, and certified by the UN, the CCIC just nullified
the votes cast by the Northerners in the seven administrative territories
of the Northern part of Ivory Coast. In other words, the vote of the Northerners
do not have, in Gbagbo's camp view, the same weight as the vote of Southerners.
That move is clearly unconstitutional. The CCIC, has
no right, no mandate, according to the Law, to act that way. The only thing
it can do according
to Article 64 of the constitution, is to reschedule
the electoral process in said part of the country - if troubles had marred
the elections. Which
is not the case, as the entirety of international observers,
and the UN's representative attested that the very minor troubles that
occurred in the North cannot be taken into account to nullify the votes
of the Northerners.
This had also been the position of the Prefects (state
high representatives) in charge of the seven northern administrative territories.
 Moreover,
on December 1, 2010, television worldwide broadcast
the image at the left side of this paragraph, that shows Gbagbo's
representative within the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI),
Damana Pikass, grabbing the ballot results papers from the hands of Bamba
Yacouba, CEI's spokesman,
and tearing them up.
And during two days running following that exploit, the CEI compound was swarming
with heavily armed soldiers, whose aim was clearly to impede the proclamation
of the results by CEI's authorities.
The president of the CEI, Youssouf Bakayoko, was obliged to
hide, to escape an eventual kidnap by Gbagbo's followers. He finally managed
to join the Golf Hotel, where Ouattara found refuge, to proclaim Ouattara the
winner with 54.10% of cast votes against 45.90% for Gbagbo.
And after the CEI had proclaimed Ouattara the winner, the CCIC issued its cooked
numbers - resulting from the obliteration of the votes cast by the seven northern
administrative territories, to announcing Gbagbo the winners with 51% of cast votes.
- Gbagbo lost the presidential ballot
Based on above discussion, anyone who doubts that Gbagbo lost the presidential
ballot second leg held on November 28, 2010, is just playing with the true.
And all the nationalistic mambo dance and talk orchestrated by Gbagbo,
followers, and supporters about the preeminence of the Constitutional Court
over the CEI do not stand a profound analysis as above demonstrated
in this text.
And the propaganda tuned by Gbagbo's camp, protesting against alleged interference
of foreign states and organizations in a sovereign state, outpassing the
Constitution of the country, to impose (a foreign) winner, is plain dishonesty,
and laughable.
All this is
smokescreen to hide the fact that the move by Gbagbo, to reverse the
results of the ballot, is an attempt to hijack the will of the majority
of the people of Ivory Coast. Simply put, it is blatant dictatorship.
It is worth noticing that the same certification process implemented by
the UN's special representative in Ivory Coast, had been done for the results
of the first leg of the election, without raising any contestation from
Gbagbo and followers. Why what was good for the first leg cannot be valid
for the second?
Further, international organizations, the UN, the European Union,
and many single foreign countries invested a lot of money (about US$300
million in total over 8 years) for the preparation and supervision of the
election. That involvement had been accepted by the Gbagbo's
camp. So, one is entitled to ask this simple question: Where does foreign
interference starts and stops?
Anyone who is for harmony amongst the people of a nation, and amongst nations
of the world cannot support Gbagbo actions, bullying and mafia practices,
leading to the establishment of a dictatorship.
- The Emperor Gbagbo has no clothes
Thankfully, the emperor Gbagbo has no clothes.
He is still parading in the presidential palace, giving interviews, and
presiding ministerial sessions with his internationally non-recognized
appointed prime minister. But he has no clothes. He
had been stripped off the sovereign attributes of a reigning president.
Indeed, as soon as the CEI released the true, valid and certified
results, Ouattara acted swiftly
to assert his power, taking
three major
strategic moves.
- The
Diplomatic Seclusion of Gbagbo
He made extensive use of his huge worldwide contacts list to
gain the support of the powers of the day, from the United States
of America, Africa, and Europe; and to secure the backing of the
UN, the World Bank, the IMF, The African Union, The Ecowas.
You name it, he got it. Gbagbo is plainly isolated. Worse, most of
his staunch backers are now on the United States "No Fly" list.
That means they cannot travel anymore to the United States of America.
The same with the European Union.
All this means for instance that Gbagbo's designated foreign minister
cannot travel to the States or Europe to defend the regime. He is
a persona non Grata with the UN, after proffering verbal menaces
of deportation towards the UN Secretary General's personal representative
in Ivory Coast.
Further, all ambassadors appointed by Gbagbo have been recalled to Abidjan, and
the foreign states got notice from Ouattara's government that these people do
not have credentials anymore to represent the state of Ivory Coast.
- The Financial Squeeze
Ouattara, based on his worldwide diplomatic recognition as the elected president,
wrote to the Central Bank of the West African French speaking countries (BCEAO,)
asking for the closing of the credit line attributed within the bank's book to
the State of Côte-d'ivoire, and gave instructions to the bank management,
to report any request of credit to the prime minister of his government.
That means, Gbagbo would be running out of money in a very short
span of time - one week to two weeks, starting from this time of
writing in January 14, 2010. The same action had been requested from
all local banks, the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development
Bank.
- The Allegiance of Local Power Holders
Parliament members, mayors and other local power brokers are streaming into Ouattara's
provisional headquarters - located within the "Golf Hotel" at Abidjan,
to make allegiance to Ouattara.
This means that Ouattara has the support of the hinterland, the whole
Northern territory and most places in the South, and can organize
a political upheaval and final showdown against Gbagbo - if he chooses
to do so.
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The only apparent remaining backing for Gbagbo, is the Army, and the
hired mercenary from Liberia. But that also is pure illusion,
as the ethnic divide run deep in the Army, where the Army ranks and officers
from the Northern part of the country are waiting for assert their new found power
against those from the Gbagboland.
Further, the Army heads currently supporting Gbagbo, backed by heavily armed soldiers (on tenth of the army rank and file), assisted by mercenary from Liberia, are perfectly aware that the state power base
is daily shifting towards Ouattara and Houphouet's Heirs.
One is entitled therefore to expect an U-turn of the Army, abandoning the
loser for the winner; the currently supporting generals and officers running for hide, to benefit from the huge amount of
tax-payers money gave to them by Gbagbo, to gain their support and backing.
To conclude, based on above discussion, one can predict that Gbagbo have
no choice but to quit the power. Forcibly, if he does not listen to the
injunction to step down in favor of the winner, Alassane Dramane Ouattara
recognized by the international community - as decided
by the Ecowas's leaders during
their meeting at Abuja, Nigeria, on December 25, 2010.
At the time of the completion
of this text, on January 14,
2010, Gbagbo is still hanging
on,
refusing adamantly to step down, his soldiery killing people and committing
abuses all around Abidjan district, the economic capital-city, and in his
"homeland" in the center-west part of the country. One can, however, state
without any restraint, that he is just running to meet trouble halfway.
Time is ticking by.
Nolens volens he will step down. Otherwise, the whole continent is in danger
of seeing the emergence of brutal dictatorships.
Once fully in charge, Ouattara, on his part, would have an immense job
at hand to heal a wounded country, to reconciliate aggrieved hearts, keep
the nation together, and particularly engineer a development policy that
create riches for all, leading a
previously prosperous nation back on track.
Click here for the beginning of the article
About
the author: Dr.
Bienvenu-Magloire Quenum is the principal/ managing director of Dr. Quenum & Associates,
IBC. He is an experienced Investment & Business Planner with 25 years consulting
practice in African countries. He is the editor in chief of Africabiz
Online
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